Abstract
Since the mid-1990s a range of Southern social standard initiatives have emerged, including in the African horticultural industry. In this paper I analyse two Kenyan standard initiatives in the cut flower sector -a business initiative and a multistakeholder initiative. I investigate how international social standard requirements are 'localized', and how standards are played in different ways by different stakeholders in order to gain influence and to further specific goals. The analysis shows that when the standards are negotiated and performed, the power relations that exist both between local stakeholders and along the global value chain (GVC) for cut flowers are reflected and reproduced. The analysis further reveals a general tension between a focus on private social standards (PSSs) as a technical tool to achieve social compliance based on outcome standards, and a focus on PSSs as a means of enhancing the process through which workers claim their rights. This tension is clearly reflected in the fact that when the multistakeholder standard is endorsed by other local standard initiatives, it is to the exclusion of the multistakeholder institution and to the exclusion of the participatory auditing methodology -the main vehicle through which process rights are promoted. Placing the local standard initiatives in the context of GVC governance, this paper also illustrates how local standard initiatives can be seen as indirectly playing into the governance agenda of retail buyers, because local standards (particularly multistakeholder standards) offer better insurance against conflict and create necessary consensus and 'back-up' from critical voices, both locally and in buyer markets.
Introduction
Private Social Standards (PSSs) covering the employment conditions of Southern producers exporting to European markets have multiplied rapidly since the 1990s. Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and large buyers have increasingly adopted labour standards along global value chains (GVCs), such as the right to form trade unions, and abolishing discrimination, child and forced labour. PSSs, however, remain highly disputed, particularly since the intended positive impact of PSSs by no means is guaranteed. Amongst other things, standard initiatives have been criticised for being Northern driven, for implementing a Northern agenda on Southern producers and workers, for not being sensitive to local specific conditions and for not including local stakeholders , Utting 2005 , Blowfield & Dolan 2008 ).
Most PSS initiatives have been designed in the North. Lately, however, a range of Southern standard initiatives have emerged in the African horticultural industry. These local initiatives are most often run by producer associations, although a few multistakeholder initiatives have also appeared. 1 The Kenyan horticultural industry provides an interesting case, since no less than four local standard initiatives exist in parallel, including two business association standards (Kenya Flower Council (KFC) and the Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya standards (FPEAK)), and a multistakeholder initiative (Kenyan Horticultural Ethical Business Initiative (HEBI)). Additionally, the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) has also developed a standard for the national horticultural industry. Kenya thus provides an interesting case for exploring what happens when international pressure for minimum social standards is translated into local standard initiatives.
In this paper, I argue that the move towards 'localising' PSSs cannot uncritically be seen as automatically furthering the interests of the intended beneficiaries of social standards (workers, their families and communities) nor as necessarily representing a 'Southern' agenda as opposed to a 'Northern' one. Through case studies of KFC and HEBI, this paper investigates how the introduction of PSS requirements are 'localized' and how standards are played in different ways by different stakeholders in order to gain influence and forward specific goals. Local standards are analysed against the background of local power relations. But local PSS initiatives also operate in the context of GVCs, particularly buyer-driven value chains, where lead firms govern the activity of other firms in the chain (Barrientos 2003 , Riisgaard 2007 , Gibbon & Ponte 2005 , Tallontire 2007 ). In this paper, the Kenyan PSS initiatives are therefore placed in the context of the GVC for cut flowers, particularly the strand of the value chain that is driven by large European retailers. 2 This enables an analysis of how local standard initiatives fit into the governance mechanisms employed by powerful buyers and a discussion of whether these local initiatives from a value chain governance perspective create contesting terrains.
To carry out the examination of local PSSs, I employ an analytical framework that combines explorations of horizontal interactions between stakeholders at the local level with vertical interconnections to stakeholders related to and involved in the GVC for cut flowers. Global Value Chains Analysis is employed as an overall frame and used to situate the local PSSs in vertical relations of power. Particular attention is paid to the governance mechanisms employed by large retailers. The local level of PSS constitutes the second and interconnected level of analysis. In the forefront here are relations of power and negotiation.
For this purpose, I draw selectively on the conceptual framework developed by Tallontire (2007) to analyse developing country private standard initiatives in agri-food value chains. Tallontire also brings into play GVC analysis, but expands the understanding of governance by adapting concepts from convention theory and from analysis of regulation. I focus on the parts of Tallontire's framework that deal with legislative governance (who makes the rules and how) and judicial governance (how conformity is assessed). Underlying the analysis is an understanding of standards as socially mediated and therefore neither objective nor unbiased. Conversely, standards are always embedded in particular systems of social relations, and standard outcomes often reflect differences in power between different actors (Busch 2000, Hatanaka et al. 2006 ). The paper is based on fieldwork I carried out in 2006 covering 10 export flower farms in Kenya.
Additionally, a range of interviews were conducted with industry organisations, industry consultants, local and international standard initiatives, labour NGOs and trade unions at national as 2 The Kenyan-European cut flower value chain entails two distinctive strands (a direct strand driven by large retailers and a strand where flowers are traded at the Dutch flower auctions).
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well as district-and farm-branch levels. Follow-up interviews with key stakeholders were carried out in May 2008 (for interview reference key see footnote 3 ).
Following this introduction is a section on the developments in the global flower value chain, including discussions of private social standards and the Kenyan context. In section 3, I turn to the Kenyan PSS initiatives focusing on legislative and judicial governance, the motivation and strategies of the different stakeholders, as well as the relation to GVC governance. Section 4 concludes by reflecting on how power inequalities are played out in the localization of PSSs in Kenya and how the local standard initiatives can be seen as indirectly playing into the governance agenda of retail buyers.
Private social standards and cut flowers in Kenya

REORGANISING PRODUCTION
Private social standard (PSS) initiatives, both international and local, operate in the context of GVCs. The production strategies of MNEs have changed substantially since the 1970s. At present, they are often characterised less by direct foreign investment and more by indirect sourcing through GVCs linking them to networks of suppliers in developing countries (Dicken 2007) . This shift has been described at length in the GVC literature, which traces the linkages between production, distribution, retailing and consumption. This body of literature highlights the ability of some lead firms 4 to govern the activity of other firms in the chain (e.g. Governance is defined by Gereffi as "authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain" (1994:97). Governance thus refers to the process of organising activities with the purpose of achieving a certain functional division of labour along a value chain. It results in specific distributions of gains, and sets terms of participation and of exclusion (Ponte 2008) . Gereffi originally distinguished between buyer-and producer-driven 5 value chains to describe two distinct forms of overall chain governance. Producer-driven chains are usually found in sectors with high technological and capital requirements, and here chain governance is exercised by companies that control key technology and production facilities. Buyer-driven chains, such as the retailer-driven 'strand' of the cut flower value chains, are generally more labour intensive, and information costs, product design, advertising, and advanced supply management systems set the entry barriers. In these chains production functions are usually outsourced, and the retailers and brand name companies exercise key governance functions defining what is to be produced .
In general, a move towards buyer drivenness 6 in GVCs can be observed particularly in GVCs led by branded manufactures and retailers (Gibbon and Ponte 2005 . In buyerdriven GVCs, a movement can be detected from direct control to more indirect or 'hands off' mechanisms of governance. This includes a heightened explicit role for quality within a framework of control at a distance and the increased importance of standards and auditing technologies and methods (Gibbon and Ponte 2005, Power 1999 ). The heightened importance of quality (broadly defined) relates to a shift from an economy of quantities to an economy of qualities (Callon et al. 2002) , where quality is becoming a central component of economic competition, and where private quality standards and their ability to differentiate products therefore are becoming increasingly important (Hatanaka et al. 2006 ). This shift is mirrored in GVCs by an 5 The distinction between buyer-and producer-driven chains describes only one aspect of governance. For example, GVCs can move from one category to the other (Ponte 2008) . Furthermore, actors external to the chain can have an important say in how a GVC is governed -these actors can be NGOs, trade unions, 'experts', certification bodies, and/or providers of support services (see Ponte 2008 , Riisgaard 2007 , Herod 2001 , Coe et al. 2007 . 6 'Drivenness' is a measurement of power and describes the degree of capability in determining the functional division of labour along the value chain, in setting quality and other demands, and in dictating the terms of participation or exclusion, as well as the rewards of participation (Raikes et al. 2000 , Ponte 2008 ) The degree of drivenness can differ significantly ranging from highly driven GVCs to GVCs that are not driven.
extension of governance to wider issues, such as management standards, environmental standards and, more recently, social standards that are observed by suppliers (Nadvi 2008 , Nadvi K & Wältring 2004 , Reardon et al. 2001 , Gibbon & Ponte 2005 , Tallontire 2007 , Hatanaka et al. 2006 ).
Restructuring the cut flower value chain
The move towards buyer driveness is evident in the cut flower value chain, where structural shifts in distribution channels in EU markets are taking place, with the growing importance of supermarkets sourcing directly from suppliers in developing countries, cutting out wholesalers and the Dutch auctions 7 (Thoen et al. 2000 , CBI 2005 . The world market for cut flowers has grown consistently since the early 1980s, but has experienced a slowing growth in demand over the past five to ten years, especially in the EU. At the same time, increases in production (especially in developing countries) have led to a downward movement in prices. Consumers in EU markets are demanding greater variety and are increasingly interested in the environmental and social dimensions of production. This is leading to a proliferation of social and environmental standards in the industry (Thoen et al. 2000 , CBI 2005 ).
The Kenyan-European cut flower value chain entails two distinctive strands (the direct strand and the auction strand). The Dutch flower auctions have historically been the most important channels through which flowers are distributed to European wholesalers and retailers. But lately the proportion of flowers imported into the EU from East Africa that goes through the Dutch flower auctions has diminished, and direct sourcing by large retailers is increasing. The auctions still remain the most important world market outlet for cut flowers, however, and the most significant way that cut flowers from East Africa reach European wholesalers and retailers (Thoen et al. 2000) . Since standards are a requirement only for producers participating in the 'direct' strand of the GVC, which is driven by large retailers, in this paper I focus on this particular strand (hereafter simply named the flower GVC).
The increase of direct sourcing by large retailers is having a significant impact on governance (due to the retailers' considerable market power) as well as an increasing demand for compliance with social and environmental standards. More complex consumer demands and a more demanding regulatory environment faced by retailers have posed demands on retailer governance practices 7 The Dutch auctions basically function as a distribution centre, absorbing large quantities of flowers that are repacked and sold to buyers from all over the world. The system is based on three key components: the concentration of supply; a public price discovery system; and a cooperative organisation structure (Thoen et al. 2000) .
and how they manage their value chains, both to avert negative publicity and to differentiate their products. One way that retailers have achieved this is by codifying the knowledge required to meet quality specifications in standards and grading systems. Social and environmental standards are an extension of this process and one way in which retailers seek to reduce risks and govern their value chains . In cut flowers, PSSs therefore form part of the mechanisms that are used by retailers to govern the GVC. Supermarkets externalise non core functions, such as monitoring of quality and coordinating supply logistics, upstream in the chain towards exporters. The best example of this is seen in Kenya where larger growers have tailored their operations to sell directly to retail outlets in Europe through offering value-added production and supply chain management to supermarkets. This has been achieved through vertical integration down-stream into freight forwarding, clearance-and sales agency (ibid). The direct strand for flowers is highly driven by supermarket buyers, particularly UK retailers.
PRIVATE SOCIAL STANDARDS IN CUT FLOWERS
Critique in consumer markets of appalling working conditions in factories and plantations in developing countries producing consumer goods for the Northern markets spurred the formulation and adaptation of PSSs. Standards covering the employment conditions of Southern producers exporting to European markets increased rapidly throughout the 1990s, and MNEs and large buyers have increasingly adopted labour standards along GVCs, such as the right to form trade unions and abolishing discrimination, child and forced labour.
The nature of cut flowers and the character of the flower trade have set the frame for some highly criticised working conditions in the industry. The Kenyan flower industry in particular has been one of the favourite targets for campaigns, both locally and in Europe, demanding better environmental and social conditions. Export of cut flowers from East Africa is an example of how tightened quality regulations and increasing concerns with social and environmental issues have created a highly codified industry. For producers participating in value chains driven by large retailers, adopting social and environmental standards is a requirement, and it is not unusual for producers to comply with half a dozen different social and environmental standards (cf. Collinson 2001 .
Social standards differ significantly in origin (both in terms of geography and actors involved) as well as in content, implementation and monitoring procedures. Initially, these standards mostly took the form of unilateral business initiatives, but later they have also included broader business and multistakeholder initiatives. (2003) puts it: "cleaning up down South comes cheap", and PSSs can be seen as reinforcing existing power imbalances and as a new mechanism of control through selfcontrol. Additionally, when PSSs touch down in local settings, they invariably interact with local relations of power and politics and should not be viewed as neutral market tools (Ponte 2008 , Riisgaard 2007 , Hatanaka et al. 2006 . Local PSS initiatives therefore need to be seen as sights of struggle and contestation, which might reinforce or change roles and inter-relationships (Tallontire 2007 , du Toit 2002 . Thus, the emergence of local standard initiatives needs to be addressed in the context of power relations both within the GVC and between the local stakeholders. Before proceeding to explore how this unfolds in Kenya cut flowers, a critical discussion of the potential and limitations of PSSs is presented.
The potential and limitations of PSSs
The benefits of PSSs remain highly disputed. First of all, they are almost exclusively limited to export industries. Secondly, reviews have highlighted that many are weak in content, especially in terms of workers' right to organise and bargain collectively, as well as in relation to gender issues This relates to a point highlighted by Barrientos and Smith (2007) , namely the distinction between outcome standards and process rights. Process rights, for example the principles of freedom of association and no discrimination, describe intrinsic principles of social justice that enable workers to claim their rights. These process rights provide a route to the negotiation of and access to other entitlements and specified conditions of employment, such as a health and safety policy, minimum wages, working hours and deductions for employment benefits such as health insurance and pensions. These entitlements and specified conditions of employment are labelled outcome standards. Most PSSs are now based on ILO core conventions and thus comprise both outcome standards and process rights. Nevertheless, in a comprehensive study of the effects of PSSs amongst suppliers to members of the ETI 9 , it was found that while PSSs were having an effect on outcome standards, they were having little or no effect on process rights (Barrientos & Smith 2007) .
8 A participatory approach to codes of labour practice puts greater emphasis on involvement of workers and workers' organisations in the process of standard implementation and assessment. It is based on developing partnerships between different actors (companies, trade unions, NGOs and preferably governments) in developing a locally sustainable approach to the improvement of working conditions. This approach is sensitive to uncovering and thus addressing more complex issues such as gender discrimination and sexual harassment. A participatory approach can be developed at different levels. At a minimum, it involves the use of participatory tools in the process of social auditing. At its broadest level, it involves the development of local multistakeholder initiatives forming an independent body able to oversee the implementation and monitoring (Auret & Barrientos 2004) . 9 The ETI is a UK initiative to promote and improve the implementation of corporate codes of practice which cover
That PSSs have more impact on outcome standards than process rights relates to auditing methods and reflects the dominance of a technical compliance perspective. Checklist auditing and selfassessment have been the main ways of monitoring PSS implementation. This system is compatible with other forms of technical and financial auditing, and is often carried out by companies who also specialise in those activities. While technical social auditing is able to identify outcome standards, such as health and safety provisions and wages, it has proved less capable to identify process rights (Barrientos & Smith 2007 ). This in turn reflects a general tension between a focus on PSS as a technical tool to achieve social compliance based on outcome standards, and a focus on PSS as a means of enhancing the process through which workers claim their rights. In multistakeholder initiatives, to which I will turn shortly, this tension often plays out as a tension between civil society and commercial actors.
This tension is also evident in a wider debate concerning the kinds of issues that are addressed and, more importantly, not addressed in PSSs. As highlighted by Blowfield & Frynas (2005) and Blowfield & Dolan (2008) , the meaning of PSS initiatives is represented as being self-evident, but in effect it is highly significant which issues are open for discussion and which are not. Studies 
Multistakeholder initiatives, Southern initiatives and issues of power and representation
Retailers have responded to criticism by creating alliances with the very groups that criticise them in so-called multistakeholder initiatives where NGOs, multilateral and other organisations encourage companies to participate in initiatives that set social standards, monitor compliance, promote social reporting and auditing, and encourage stakeholder dialogue and social learning Gramsci has referred to as "moral, cultural and intellectual" leadership as a basis for rule via consensus as opposed to coercion. In GVC language, this argument touches upon the potential role of multistakeholder standard initiatives as a tool that indirectly reinforces the governance agenda of buyer-driven value chains, because they enable cooperation and consensus while securing against conflict.
Another criticism concerns the fact that many multistakeholder initiatives and PSSs in general, have been developed in the North, and there is concern that these fail to incorporate Southern stakeholders and the concerns of workers in developing countries (Barrientos 2003 , Tallontire 2007 , Blowfield & Dolan 2008 . Southern initiatives have occurred to counter this trend. According to Barrientos (2003) , Southern initiatives reflect a move away from a Northern-based focus towards local engagement in how standards and standard implementation can more genuinely address and improve the needs and rights of workers. In this view, Southern initiatives are better able to address worker needs at a local level and in the specific local context. Discrimination based on gender or race may, for example, be embedded in social norms and thus require different strategies in one context compared to another. Furthermore, local initiatives can address more context specific and more complex issues at an ongoing rather than an on-off basis (Barrientos 2003) . Blowfield and Dolan (2008) highlight how African standard initiatives, no more than Northern initiatives, are formulated by the workers they purport to benefit. It is also questionable exactly how local the local initiatives actually are. Do they represent a new position that in any substantial way contests existing Northern initiatives or the dominant position of Northern buyers? The following sections will show that local standards can to some degree play into the governance agenda of buyer-driven value chains.
3. Kenyan social standard initiatives
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK & BACKGROUND
In this part of the paper I turn to an analysis of relations of power, contestation and negotiation in local PSSs in Kenya. The analysis is based on the understanding that the content of standards and how they are performed is often the outcome of strategic actions and negotiations between involved stakeholders reflecting existing power differences (Hatanaka et al. 2006 , Bingen & Siyengo 2002 , Juska et al. 2000 . Each stakeholder has its own agenda and ideas about quality (in this case ideas about what constitutes acceptable social conditions) that it seeks to implement, and standards are used to further this agenda. Thus, the way standards are negotiated and used may reflect and reproduce power relations that exist both between local stakeholders and along the GVC.
As recommended by Tallontire (2007) , I start by analysing the rules which are being developed and implemented through the PSSs. A next step is charting the evolution of the PSS opening up for discussions about who makes the rules and how (what Tallontire refers to as 'legislative governance'). This concerns the origin of the standard, the extent to which it draws on international standards or includes locally specific criteria, the links it has with other standards, both in the public and private domains, and identification of who is involved and who may be excluded. This is particularly pertinent in relation to worker representation, as new forms of worker representation are legitimised through NGO advocacy. Attention is also given to what Tallontire names 'judicial governance', referring to the way compliance is monitored and assessed. This issue is particularly relevant since the initiatives differ substantially in this area. Finally, the initiatives are set in the context of governance of the cut flower GVC and the important question of whether these local PSSs actually represent a form of 'control at a distance' on the part of lead buyers.
Focus is on the KFC and HEBI standards, the two initiatives developed explicitly for the flower industry. These two standard initiatives provide appropriate grounds for comparison, since they are substantially different both in relation to the structure of the standard initiatives and in the methodologies they employ for assessing compliance. Two other local standard initiatives (FPEAK and KEBS) were not specifically designed for cut flowers, but contain general standards for horticultural products. The FPEAK and KEBS standards are not analysed in this paper, but since they are relevant in relation to both KFC and HEBI, they are briefly introduced in the following together with a short overview of other relevant local stakeholders.
The development of local PSSs in Kenya
Kenya is one of the top players in the world cut flower industry (the 4 th largest) with a value of USD 313 million out of a total export value of USD 354 million from Sub Saharan Africa (the global value was USD 5.5 billion in 2007). 10 The export flower industry in Kenya started to take off in the late sixties and cut flowers are now the nation's second largest source of foreign exchange in agriculture (after tea), providing employment to an estimated 50,000 workers. Although there are an estimated 5,000 flower farms in Kenya, a tendency can be seen towards concentration, with three-quarters of the exports supplied by about 25 large-and medium-scale operations (Opondo 2002 , Thoen et al. 2000 .
The Kenyan flower industry has been one of the favourite targets for campaigns both locally and in Europe demanding better environmental and social conditions. Since the 1990s, producers (particularly producers supplying EU retailers) have adopted a range of social and environmental standards (see also Integration with international and national standard initiatives through accreditation, recognition and cooperation has constituted an important tactic for KFC since its first code was drawn in 1998. Alignment with international standards serves the purpose of keeping members up-to-date with buyer standard demands and thus helps members to remain competitive. At the same time, it makes the KFC standard more attractive (and less costly) to flower growers by offering a 'one off' audit (interview St2 2006). In turn, this allows KFC to capture a larger chunk of the auditing and certification market. Alignment with international standards is moreover necessary to gain reputational recognition amongst buyers.
Integration and cooperation with local standard initiatives likewise offers several advantages. As mentioned, KFC is lobbying to make the KEBS code a national requirement for export licenses.
This would compel growers to become members of KFC (or FPEAK), since this would be the easiest and cheapest way to obtain the required certification to acquire an export licence. Around 120 flower growers are members of either KFC (approx. 50) or FPEAK (approx.70). This leaves out some 4000 flower growers, most of which are smallholders. In practice, they would have to become members (and pay membership, audit and certification fees) if they wanted to continue exporting. But many of the existing smaller producers may not have the management system in place to comply and to document compliance with the standard. For the larger exporters, compliance will not cause a problem, since they are already complying with various private international standards. While making the KEBS code a national requirement for export licenses would certainly broaden the reach of social standard implementation in the industry, there is a real danger that it could also lead to further consolidation and exclusion of smaller actors.
KFC participates in HEBI at board level, thereby engaging at the institutional level with the NGOs, which have been the main critical voice in the country. Hereby, they accommodate critical voices both locally and abroad and are able to 'contain' some of the negative publicity (this is considered in more detail in connection with the analysis of HEBI). At the same time, the involvement with HEBI plays into the existing conflict between NGOs and unions in the sector.
Thus, KFC effectively recognises labour NGOs as preferred partners when discussing labour rights issues and social standards in the industry.
Localization and relation to GVC governance
While KFC founders had some autonomy in drafting the code, it was powerfully shaped by UK Council code seventh edition).
The KFC social standard to some extent represents a localization move due to its reference to specific parts of the national legislation. However, this is not unambiguously a process towards local sensitivity and empowerment. On the contrary, the KFC initiative can be seen as a move towards alignment with international standards and audit procedures which focus on documentation and traceability and employ a technical checklist approach to measuring standard compliance. In this way the KFC standard, as most other PSSs, can be presented as a technical tool to achieve social compliance based on outcome standards as opposed to a focus on PSS as a means of enhancing the process through which workers claim their rights.
Both legislative governance (who makes the rules and how) and judicial governance (how compliance is assessed) of the KFC standard is strongly shaped by the demands of retailers. Furthermore, the standards does in no way contest the power of large buyers in the value chain. In other words, what is agreed upon in the KFC standard is already accepted and increasingly demanded by EU flower buyers. Even though the standard initiative is local, it is shaped around the same managerial audit culture as the buyer standards. The emergence of the KFC standard can therefore be seen as a move towards 'self regulation' by producers in developing countries, and in this way it plays into a general governance move towards more indirect forms of governance in buyer-driven value chains. By being local the standard is helping to avoid conflict through its ability to detect and address non-compliance and disputes at an early stage and in a continuous way. In this way the local standards indirectly can aid buyers in creating the necessary 'back-up' from critical voices both locally and in the buyer markets.
Perhaps somewhat paradoxical is the fact that even though pressure from civil society at both ends of the value chains was influential in bringing about the KFC standard, civil society did not participate in standard setting and is not involved in monitoring. The realms of both legislative and judicial governance are exclusively confined to the largest producers and EU buyers (the most important of which are associate members of KFC) 14 . In this way, both smaller producers and all other stakeholders are excluded from this process as well as from implementation. So even though the KFC standard represents a localisation move, the standard caters to business interests to the exclusion of the end-beneficiaries or organisations purporting to represent them. 
THE HORTICULTURAL ETHICAL BUSINESS INITIATIVE (HEBI)
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Motivation and power -a stakeholder analysis
As mentioned earlier, HEBI was formed because -despite the existence of initiatives that address labour standards on cut flower farms -a number of workers' rights violations persisted on these farms (ETI 2005 , interviews St3 2008 . The main problem seemed not to be the content of the standards, but the way in which compliance was assessed. At that time, many organisations were using their own auditors. Some standards were industry bodies with farms as members and the same body policing those farms led to potential conflicts of interest, with little transparency or involvement of external, independent stakeholders. Additionally, very few had established ongoing links with local trade unions and NGOs and none were using a participatory audit method-
ology (ETI 2005). 18
The mandate of HEBI was to develop a social audit system that was participatory in nature and that would be able to remedy the mentioned shortcomings while being acceptable to all stakeholders, including retailers in the North. HEBI was to develop detailed terms of reference for the audit of flower farms, raise funds to finance the audit process and appoint and contract independent auditors and approve the audit process (ETI 2005, www.hebi.org ). An important aspect of HEBI was at the same time to ensure dialogue and contain damaging press amongst former adversarial stakeholders. The different stakeholders in the flower industry, however, had diverse and sometimes opposing motivations for participating (or not participating) in HEBI as well as diverging agendas for the desired performance of HEBI. In the next sub-sections I examine the local stakeholders invited to participate in HEBI. NGOs and unions and effectively recognise labour NGOs as preferred partners when discussing labour rights issues and social standards in the industry.
Industry members
For the agricultural employers association (AEA), participation in HEBI was at the outset con- auditing. But the HEBI initiative also yields other benefits for the participating labour NGOs. By getting the industry players to engage in HEBI, they have gained recognition and influence. In HEBI, they have an influential position as the only labour representatives, and as industry watchdogs with connections to solidarity groups in consumer countries. Through HEBI, they engage the biggest business actors in the industry at board meetings and potentially gain access to part of the audit economy by conducting audits against the HEBI code and by offering training and awareness-raising activities. In this way they have managed to be accepted as relevant stakeholders that merit active engagement. As a result, the labour NGOs can to some extent claim to have succeeded in influencing the local standard agenda. The Kenyan NGOs thus actively play the standard agenda and the mechanisms inherent in social standard initiatives to gain influence. In getting the industry players to engage, the labour NGOs exploited their indirect 
Integration
HEBI has chosen specific ways of promoting its standard. Like the other Kenyan initiatives, the strategy of integration has been particularly important, and all stakeholders seem to agree on the need to link up to other local standards. Particularly, efforts have been put into incorporating the HEBI standard into the KEBS standard, a national Kenyan standard and government regulation. Dolan & Opondo (2005:95) .
"In fact, workers are the most marginalised group of primary stakeholders within HEBI as it is assumed that their interests are adequately served by the civil society organisations representing them." The representation that is awarded through the HEBI initiative is one of NGOs speaking on behalf of workers. One way that HEBI does seek to award some form of direct representation to the end beneficiaries is through the participatory auditing process but, as mentioned, this particular element of the HEBI initiative has found it hard to endure.
In spite of this criticism, the HEBI initiative does represent a move towards more sensitivity to local issues and inclusion of and ownership by local stakeholders, especially in comparison to KFC. The HEBI code has borrowed heavily from the ETI Base Code, but it also contains additional and more specific clauses. For instance, it states that ''pregnant and breastfeeding mothers shall not be assigned duties which would expose them, or their babies to risk''. It is also specific on sexual harassment as a form of discrimination and it entitles three months maternity constitutes significant improvement compared to most other standards in the industry. But most of all it is the participatory social auditing techniques employed by HEBI that places the HEBI initiative as more than just a copy of existing initiatives in the sector. However, even though the HEBI initiative was initiated exactly because of deficiencies in the way compliance to social standards was assessed -participatory social auditing is precisely the element that does not seem to survive when the HEBI standard is endorsed or incorporated into other local initiatives.
HEBI is modelled on the ETI, and ETI retail members strongly encouraged their Kenyan producers to participate in the initiative. The UK supermarkets thus became key players in the establishment of HEBI, first by agreeing to listen to workers' grievances (through the ETI investigation), and then putting pressure on their suppliers to work together with the NGOs in developing HEBI (Hale & Opondo 2005 , ETI 2005 . 29 Seen from a GVC governance perspective, the HEBI initiative (even when including its participatory auditing principles) like most PSSs does not contest the power structure of the retailer-driven GVC (such as e.g. addressing buying practices which lead to and uphold adverse working conditions). What is does, however, is indirectly to offer retailers some safeguard against conflict, create necessary consensus and 'back-up' from critical voices locally (and in buyer mark- 
Conclusion
In this paper I have analysed how PSSs are localized in the Kenyan cut flower industry and illustrated how this localisation process reproduces existing power inequalities (both local and in the GVC). The analysis furthermore shows how local PSSs can be seen as indirectly playing into the governance agenda of retail buyers.
Analysing the legislative governance (who makes the rules and how) of the two Kenyan standard initiatives reveals a business association standard which is strongly shaped by international standards and the demands from retailers. Although with references to local legislation, the KFC standard is an image of existing international standards and inclusion of local stakeholders is The judicial governance (the way compliance is monitored and assessed) of these standards has proved particularly contested and interesting, not least in relation to integration and interrelations between local standards. While the KFC standard mainly employs a technical audit methodology, HEBI employs participatory social auditing methods, and this is where HEBI distinguishes itself from most existing standard initiatives. The KFC initiative can be seen as a move towards alignment with international standards and audit procedures which focus on documentation and traceability employing a technical audit approach to measuring standard compliance. Thus the KFC standard falls within a tradition of seeing PSSs as a technical tool to achieve social compliance based on outcome standards as opposed to a focus on PSS as a means of enhancing the process through which workers claim their rights (as advocated by HEBI). In other words, one could say that the way quality (in relation to social concerns) is defined, differs substantially between civil society actors focusing on process rights and commercial actors focusing on outcome standards. In the ongoing negotiation of the HEBI initiative this tension is reflected most clearly in the fact that when the HEBI standard is integrated into or endorsed by other local standard initiatives it is to the exclusion of HEBI as a multistakeholder institution and to the exclusion of key aspects of the HEBI participatory auditing methodology -the main vehicle through which process rights are promoted.
The analysis provided in this paper shows how stakeholders entered HEBI with different agendas and different power leverages. These power asymmetries to some degree determine what issues are negotiated and whose interests count, and partly explain why it is the participatory social auditing method that seems not to have endured cooperation and integration with other Kenyan standard initiatives. In these processes of integration and endorsement, existing power relations are reflected and reproduced. Seen in this light participating in multistakeholder dialogue with conventional adversaries comes cheap for the Kenyan producers.
Placing the local standard initiatives in the context of GVC governance, illustrates how local standard initiatives can be seen as indirectly playing into the governance agenda of retail buyers.
First of all, the standards are not contesting the power of retailers. Secondly, by reinforcing demands already posed by retailers the standards constitute a move towards 'self regulation' by producers in developing countries. Thirdly, by being local the standards are helping to avoid conflict through their ability to detect and address noncompliance and disputes at an early stage and in a continuous way. In this way the local standards can aid buyers in assuring producer compliance to social standards. Lastly, local standards, particularly multistakeholder standard initiatives, can enable consensus and cooperation while securing against conflict and criticism (by critical voices locally and in buyer markets) which could potentially disrupt sales. In this way localisation of standards can be seen as indirectly playing into the governance agenda of buyer driven value chains, where the lead firms now endorse (and at times actively promote) local standard initiatives not least because they offer better insurance against conflict, create necessary consensus and 'back-up' from critical voices locally and in buyer markets, and present an effective means of governing at a distance.
